Segmentation across International Equity, Bond, and Foreign Exchange Markets by Cathy Ning & Stephen Sapp
The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral
Fluctuations on Training Decisions∗
Vincenzo Caponi†, Cevat Burc Kayahan†† and Miana Plesca§
August 28, 2009
Abstract
The literature has not resolved yet whether the eﬀect of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
on training decisions is positive or negative. On the one hand, the opportunity cost
to train is lower during downturns, and thus training should be counter-cyclical. On
the other hand, a positive shock may be related to the adoption of new technologies
and increased returns to skill, making training incidence pro-cyclical. Using the Canadian
panel of Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) we document another important channel
at work: the relative position of a sector also matters. We ﬁnd not only that training moves
counter-cyclically with the aggregate business cycle (more training during downturns), but
also that the idiosyncratic sectoral shocks have a positive impact on training incidence
(more training in sectors doing relatively better). These ﬁndings help us better understand
training decisions by ﬁrms.
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Human capital increases through training, be that implicit on-the-job training (as captured by
tenure), or explicit classroom-type formal training leading to human capital accumulation. Our
focus in this paper is mostly on the latter: we are interested in how a ﬁrm’s explicit decision
to train depends on aggregate and sectoral output ﬂuctuations.
It is not ex-ante obvious whether investments in human capital are counter-cyclical, pro-
cyclical, or a-cyclical. Since the opportunity cost to train workers is lower in downturns, a
negative productivity shock should be associated with increased training. This channel is
highlighted by deJong and Ingram (2001) who ﬁnd that training activities “are distinctively
countercyclical” and by Devereux (2000) who argues that during downturns ﬁrms hoard labour
by assigning high-skill workers to lower-production activities such as training, thus avoiding
layoﬀs and ﬁxed costs associated with ﬁring and re-hiring workers.
A positive shock may also be related to the adoption of new technologies which not only
require training but can also provide increased returns to skill. Using administrative Canadian
data King and Sweetman (2002) ﬁnd that “re-tooling” is pro-cyclical, where re-tooling is mea-
sured as quits from work to school. They link this observation to a model where the outside
option of high-skill jobs goes up during episodes of high output, increasing the value of train-
ing. These ﬁndings complement a diﬀerent literature (e.g. Dellas and Sakellaris (2003)) which
documents that college enrollments are counter-cyclical; typically, enrollments in universities
increase when the economy is not doing well.
Arguments for both counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical investments in skill have sound theo-
retical justiﬁcations, yet we have little evidence which one should dominate empirically. Our
contribution here is to provide a framework where two opposing channels coexist. On the one
hand, we ﬁnd training to be counter-cyclical: the aggregate output shock has a negative impact
on the incidence of ﬁrm training. Like most of the literature, we contend this channel is work-
ing through the opportunity cost of training (foregone output) which is lower in downturns.
On the other hand, we identify a new, opposing channel: training moves pro-cyclically with
idiosyncratic sectoral shocks. In other words, ﬁrms from sectors experiencing a positive shock
relative to the rest of the economy have an incentive to train more. We contend there are two
2mechanisms at work here. First, insofar as positive sectoral shocks are related to the adoption
of new technologies, ﬁrms will invest in training to operate these new technologies. Second,
workers reallocate from the sectors hit by negative shocks into the positive ones; the workers
who are new to a sector may require training in sector-speciﬁc skills. Indeed, we document
empirically that this is the case: (i) ﬁrms who innovate or adopt new technologies train more;
(ii) there is increased training incidence by ﬁrms in sectors doing relatively better, even after
controlling for the adoption of new technologies, and (iii) the probability for a worker to get
trained is higher when the worker is new to a sector.
To measure the eﬀect of aggregate and sectoral output ﬂuctuations on training incidence
we use the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The WES is an eight-year panel
of ﬁrms (1999 to 2006) representative of all industries except agriculture.2 It is particularly
appealing because response rates are consistently high across all panel years and sample sizes
are relatively generous. Most importantly, the panel nature of the WES allows us to remove
the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in the empirical analysis. Finally, the WES is a linked
employer-employee survey where, as long as a worker stays with the original ﬁrm, she can be
surveyed for two consecutive years. While our analysis focuses mostly on the ﬁrm, we also
analyze information from the worker side as supporting evidence for sectoral reallocation and
worker training. There is one caveat: since very few workers are interviewed per establishment,
they are not representative for a ﬁrm’s workforce; nevertheless, they are representative for the
overall economy.
We consider two main deﬁnitions for training by ﬁrms: a binary indicator whether the
ﬁrm provided training or not, which we call “extensive margin of training”, and a continuous
measure of training which we call “intensive margin” (conditional on ﬁrms who train) expressed
either as percentage of workforce trained or as training expenditures per worker. Our major
ﬁndings are that (i) training moves counter-cyclically with the aggregate output ﬂuctuations
(more training in downturns), while at the same time (ii) the relative position of sectoral output
has a positive impact on training decisions (more training in a sector doing relatively better).
The magnitude of these two channels is comparable. We ﬁnd that one percentage point increase
in the deviation of aggregate output relative to its trend decreases the probability of training
2The unit of analysis is the establishment. Throughout the paper we refer to it interchangeably as “ﬁrm” or
“workplace.”
3by 1.5 percentage points and decreases training expenditures by $7 per worker. A percentage
point increase in the share of a sector’s output increases the probability of training by 0.7
percentage points and increases training expenditures per worker by $19 for the training ﬁrms.
These results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the microdata used in the analysis and
references the sources of data for sectoral and aggregate output. The main results are in Section
3 where we describe the empirical estimation methodology and our ﬁndings. Section 4 illustrates
a simple Mortenssen-Pissarides model augmented with training where the adjustments from
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks can be highlighted. Theory and policy implications are
discussed in Section 5, which concludes.
2 Data
2.1 WES Data
We use the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) from 1999 to 2006, a nationally
representative matched employer-employee survey with a longitudinal design. The WES targets
all workplaces in Canada with paid employees in March.3 The sample of locations in the frame
is stratiﬁed by industry (14 strata), region (6 strata), and ﬁrm size (3 strata). The stratiﬁcation
of units remains constant over the life of the initial panel; survey weights are used throughout
the analysis. The response rate for the workplace side is 74.9% for the 1999-2006 period, which
is relatively high for a panel survey of ﬁrms.
The linked employee component of WES is based on lists of employees made available by
the selected workplaces. A maximum of twenty four employees are sampled. In workplaces
with fewer than four employees, all employees are selected. Employees are surveyed for at most
two consecutive years, after which they are dropped from the sample and replaced with other
employees. While workers can be linked to their ﬁrms, it can be diﬃcult to infer ﬁrm-speciﬁc
distributions from the worker side, since only few workers (sometimes as little as three) are
interviewed per establishment. Nevertheless, the worker side of WES is important for our
analysis by allowing us to investigate how the tenure of a worker − within the ﬁrm and, more
3There are some exceptions. Certain industries are not sampled: farming, public administration, and religious
organizations. Also excluded are remote locations: Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories.
4importantly, within the sector − inﬂuences the propensity for the worker to get trained.
We deﬁne the “extensive margin” of training (based on ﬁrms’ self-reported answers) as an
indicator whether the ﬁrm had oﬀered any training to its workers. Training can be formal
classroom training (CT) or classroom training together with on the job training (CT+OJT).
While we focus our attention mainly on the ﬁrst deﬁnition of CT, we also present sensitivity
results to using the latter broader measure (CT+OJT). The intensive margin of training comes
either from the percentage of workforce oﬀered formal classroom training (CT) by each ﬁrm,
or from the ﬁrm’s training expenses per worker; we report analysis on both. The means of the
training variables are presented in the top panel of Table 1. To control for observed ﬁrm-speciﬁc
determinants of training, we follow the literature (e.g. Turcotte and Montmarquette (2003))
by using ﬁrm size, innovation, unionization, output market and workforce skill distribution.
These variables are listed in the bottom panel of Table 1.
2.2 Output ﬂuctuation series
To capture the aggregate business cycle eﬀects we use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
series from Statistics Canada. Series for the overall economy, as well as by sectors, are available
since the early 1980s and are reported in 2000 constant dollars. Since the time period surveyed
by the WES is between April 1st of the previous year and March 31st of the current year we
use quarterly GDP aggregated into annual series to correspond to the timing in the WES. We
detrend the real log GDP series using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter
of Λ = 6.15. While we experimented with diﬀerent smoothing parameters all the way up to
Λ = 10, changing the bandwidth did not aﬀect our results. Figure 1 presents the the HP-ﬁltered
log GDP series.
The classiﬁcation of sectors in the WES follows for most part the two-digit North American
Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) with a few small diﬀerences: in the WES, some indus-
tries from the NAICS are aggregated into a single group; and ﬁrms from the agricultural sector
are not sampled in the WES. We aggregate the sectors from the output ﬂuctuation statistics
in a manner consistent with the WES. The sectors used in the analysis together with their
relative shares are listed in Table 2. They are Forestry and Mining, Construction, Transporta-
tion, Information and Communication, Finance, Real Estate, Business Services, Education and
5Health, Manufacturing, and Retail. For the relative position of each sector we use the share of
that sector’s output in total output.4
3 Empirical evidence
The extensive and intensive margin analyses are both relevant; the former refers to a model
where ﬁrms decide whether to train or not, while the latter refers to a model where selected
ﬁrms decide how much to train. When the dependent variable is discrete we estimate a ﬁxed
eﬀects logit model; when the dependent variable is continuous we estimate a linear ﬁxed eﬀects
model. In all cases we allow for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity, which can be diﬀerenced out:5
yit = αi + βXit + uit t = 1,...,T (1)
where yit is the training decision of ﬁrm i in period t, αi denotes ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity, Xit
are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and aggregate characteristics aﬀecting training, and uit represents idiosyncratic
errors. The ﬁrst diﬀerences version removes the ﬁxed eﬀect and is very close to the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator.
∆yit = β ∆Xit + ∆uit (2)
Under the strict exogeneity identiﬁcation condition:
E(uit |Xi1,Xi2,...,XiT,αi = 0, ) t = 1,...,T (3)
the coeﬃcient vector β can be estimated consistently with ﬁxed eﬀect estimators allowing for
any correlation between Xit and the ﬁxed eﬀect αi. The strict exogeneity assumption rules
out correlations between Xit+k and uit (no feedback eﬀect). While this is certainly a strong
assumption, nevertheless, given that we explicitly control for shocks at the aggregate and
sectoral level in the vector X, strict exogeneity can be plausible in our case. Moreover, while
we start by presenting results computed under the strict exogeneity assumption, in Section 3.3
we report results from a more general speciﬁcation where we instrumenting for the possible
correlation between Xit+1 and uit.
4For reason of space, we omit from here graphs with the relative sectoral position and training incidence by
respective sectors.
5Hausman tests reject random eﬀects in favour of ﬁxed eﬀects in each speciﬁcation.
63.1 The impact of output ﬂuctuations on training: extensive margin
We start by investigating the extensive margin: how do macroeconomic factors inﬂuence the
binary decision of ﬁrms to train or not to train? The results are in Table 3. The ﬁrst speci-
ﬁcation deﬁnes training as indicator whether the ﬁrm has provided formal classroom training
or not (column 1), and the second speciﬁcation adds on-the-job training (column 3). The
macroeconomic factors are the HP-detrended log GDP and the share of each sector in total
output. All results reported here also include the HP-ﬁltered trend as a regressor. Sensitivity
analysis (available from the authors) indicates that including or not the trend does not change
the results.
While in the linear models the coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects, this is no longer the
case with the ﬁxed-eﬀects logit model. Nevertheless, the ratio of logit coeﬃcients equals the
ratio of marginal eﬀects; in this sense, the quantitative results from the logit models can be
directly compared with those from linear models. Moreover, we report in Appendix II similar
results from a linear model estimation (OLS instead of logit) to provide some benchmark for
the marginal eﬀects corresponding to our coeﬃcients.6
The coeﬃcient on aggregate output ﬂuctuations (-0.072) is negative and signiﬁcant, implying
that training is counter-cyclical. In other words, ﬁrms are more likely to train their workforce
during periods of aggregate output slow-downs. This is in line with the argument that workers
are relatively less productive during downturns, and thus the opportunity cost of training
(foregone output) is relatively smaller during recessions. By contrast, the coeﬃcient on the
relative position of the sector (0.034) is positive and signiﬁcant: ﬁrms in sectors doing relatively
better are more likely to train. The magnitude of the sectoral channel adjustment is roughly
half the one of the aggregate macro channel.7
The impact of the innovation/adoption of new technology indicator is large and positive
6For non-linear ﬁxed eﬀects models (logit in our case) the marginal eﬀects are diﬃcult to compute. For each
observation the marginal eﬀect would be Λ[βXitαi](1 − Λ[βXitαi]) where Λ is the logistic function. Without
explicit distributional assumptions for the unobserved heterogeneity term αi we cannot average it out across
the population (Wooldridge (2005)).
7In the linear model estimation reported in Appendix II, a percentage point increase in the ratio of GDP
ﬂuctuations to the HP trend will decrease the probability that a ﬁrm trains by roughly one and a half percent. A
percentage point increase in the share of the sector’s output in total output will increase the ﬁrm’s propensity to
train by 0.7 percent. The OLS numbers are consistent with the rule of thumb that marginal eﬀects are roughly
one quarter to twenty-percent of the logit coeﬃcients. Moreover, the ratio of coeﬃcients gets preserved; for
instance the ratio of aggregate relative to sectoral impacts is roughly 2.1 in both linear and non-linear models.
7(0.629), which is as expected. Notably though, the aggregate macro channel and the relative
sectoral channel have a signiﬁcant impact on training decisions, even after controlling for the
innovation variable.8
A very similar story emerges when the deﬁnition of training is expanded to add on-the-job
training to the formal classroom training deﬁnition from above. The results are in the last two
columns of table 3. Although the magnitude of the two coeﬃcients of interest - aggregate and
sectoral ﬂuctuations - is slightly smaller, their signs and relative sizes indicate that training
moves counter-cyclically with the business cycle and pro-cyclically with the idiosyncratic sec-
toral shock. This second sectoral channel, previously ignored in the literature, is of substantive
relevance.
3.2 The impact of output ﬂuctuations on training: intensive margin
We move now to investigate the impact of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on the training decision
by considering more detailed training variables: (i) the percentage of workforce trained by a
ﬁrm, and (ii) the training expenditures per worker.
One of the methodological advantages of a continuous left-hand side variable is that we
estimate a linear panel model where coeﬃcients directly translate into marginal eﬀects. More-
over, in the linear model we can account for the potential correlation in the error terms across
ﬁrms within a sector. Insofar as the i.i.d. assumption is violated, clustering the standard errors
across sectors provides for consistent inference. We report standard errors both non-clustered
and clustered by sector. Since the robust standard errors are larger, statistical signiﬁcance
becomes problematic for a lot of the control variables. Nevertheless, the relevant variables for
our analysis, aggregate and sectoral ﬂuctuations and innovation, remain signiﬁcant throughout
the analysis.9
We start with a speciﬁcation that includes all ﬁrms in the sample, those who train a positive
8In terms of the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that inﬂuence training, we ﬁnd that on average high training
ﬁrms are more diversiﬁed and larger, more likely to not be unionized, and less likely to employ sales and
technical personnel. This is in line with what has been documented elsewhere in the literature of ﬁrm training
determinants − see for instance Lynch and Black (1998) for the U.S., Dearden, Reed, and Reenen (2006) for
the U.K., and Turcotte and Montmarquette (2003) for Canada.
9While it may be interesting to revisit the literature of ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of training given how
standard errors increase when we cluster by sector, this is not our goal. For the purpose of this paper we are
satisﬁed that the statistical signiﬁcance of the main variables, GDP and sectoral deviations, remains unaﬀected.
8amount as well as those who do not train (results in Table 4). We use this speciﬁcation to
benchmark the results from the intensive margin analysis where we select in the sample only
ﬁrms who train positive amounts (results in Table 5). While the magnitude of coeﬃcients
is obviously larger in the positive training speciﬁcation, the diﬀerences are small and do not
change the substance of the analysis.
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 is for the left-hand side variable deﬁned as percentage of the
workforce trained by the ﬁrm. The next two columns report standard errors, without and
with accounting for clustering by industries. The second speciﬁcation reports the results when
training is measured as training expenditures per worker (column 4) followed by unclustered and
clustered standard errors. A percentage point increase in the deviation of (detrended) output
from HP trend decreases the percentage of workforce trained by .65 percent. A percentage point
increase in the share of a sector in total output increases the percentage of workforce trained
by .53 percent. When looking at the impact on training expenditures per worker (column 4)
the percentage change in the business cycle measure, GDP ﬂuctuations, decreases the training
expenditure by $4, but this impact is not statistically signiﬁcant. By contrast, an increase in
the relative share of a sector by one percentage point will increase the training expenditures by
$14 (statistically signiﬁcant).
The same picture emerges when we focus on ﬁrms which consistently train, only the mag-
nitude of the impacts is larger. These results are in Table 5. Conditional on training a positive
amount (“intensive margin”), a percentage point increase in the GDP deviation decreases the
percentage of workforce trained by .895 percent and the training expenditures per worker by
$7. A percentage point increase in the relative position of the sector increases the share of the
workforce trained by 0.7 percentage points and the training expenditure by $19 per worker.
Firms who innovate and adopt new technologies train 8 percent more of their workforce and
spend $76 more per worker compared to ﬁrms who do not innovate. All coeﬃcients except for
the impact of GDP ﬂuctuations on training expenditures are statistically signiﬁcant. When
training was deﬁned as percent of workforce trained, the aggregate and sectoral channels had
similar magnitudes (and of course opposite signs); here the dollar impact is much larger on the
sectoral variable than on the aggregate output one.Overall the story coming from the continu-
ous deﬁnitions of training is similar to the story on training incidence. Firms will train more if
9the sectors they operate in are hit by relatively favourable idiosyncratic shocks, and will train
less when GDP moves above trend.
3.3 Relaxing strict exogeneity: quantitative results under sequential
exogeneity
Strict exogeneity is a strong assumption which need not hold when feedback eﬀects are present.
While we do control for aggregate and sectoral shocks explicitly, as well as for ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects,
there remains the possibility that a particular ﬁrm experiences an unanticipated shock speciﬁc
only to the ﬁrm, and not to the sector or to the economy. To account for this possibility, we
relax the strict exogeneity assumption by replacing it with the weaker sequential exogeneity
assumption:
E(uit |Xi1,Xi2,...,Xit,αi) = 0, t = 1,...,T (4)
In this formulation feedback shocks from uit to Xi,t+k are accommodated as uit needs to be
uncorrelated with all past and current realizations of the endogenous variable X, but not with
future ones.
Building on methodology by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), β
can be estimated consistently with a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The
following moment conditions become available from the ﬁrst diﬀerences equation 2:
E(Xi,t−s∆uit) = 0 for s   k (5)
The moment conditions imply that lagged levels of the variables in X from period t − k and
earlier can be used as instruments for the diﬀerences in period t where the value of k depends
on the structure of the error term. If we can assume that uit follows an AR(1) process, then
k = 2 and we are able to use lagged levels of the variables from two periods and earlier on as
instruments for the diﬀerences in period t.
Blundell and Bond (1998) show how further additional moment conditions can be obtained
by imposing certain restrictions on the initial moment conditions:10:
E[∆Xi,t−s(αi + uit)] = 0 for s   2 (6)
10Joint stationarity of yit and Xit as a suﬃcient but not necessary condition.
10Equation (6) implies that we can use the lagged diﬀerences of the regressors as instruments
in the level equation (1). Therefore, the information provided by the moment conditions (5)
and (6) allow us to use the lagged values of levels of the regressors as instruments in the
diﬀerence equation (2) and the lagged values of diﬀerences of regressors as instruments in the
level equation 1.
The results from this estimation are in Table 6. While quantitatively the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients decreases, the sign of the adjustments stays the same. The impacts of the sectoral
shock are somewhat larger, and statistically signiﬁcant, for both speciﬁcations (percentage of
workforce trained and training expenditures per worker). The impact of GDP ﬂuctuations
is negative, though not signiﬁcant. The technology adoption factor is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation (percentage workforce trained) but not in the second (training expenditures).
As far as speciﬁcation tests go, we look at the validity of the AR(1) assumption as well
as the validity of instruments (with IV overidentiﬁcation test; by construction we have many
instruments). We test for serial correlation with the Arellano and Bond test. We do not reject
the AR(1) structure for uit while we do reject AR(2) in both speciﬁcations. This is good news,
as the validity of instruments depends on the absence of serial correlation in ǫit in the AR(1)
process uit = ρuit−1 + ǫit. The lag instruments are for most part not signiﬁcant, except for
the lag dependent variable; this is problematic as it can be indicative of weak instruments.
Nevertheless, the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, given the large number of
instruments, we also report the Sargen-Hansen test of over identifying restrictions. In both
speciﬁcations the tests do not reject the validity of the instruments.
The main message from this sensitivity analysis is that, even under weaker identiﬁcation
assumption, the sectoral channel still has an important eﬀect: the better the relative position of
a sector, the more likely for ﬁrms in this sector to train. The aggregate channel is still present,
even though less strongly: if the whole economy is experiencing a positive shock, all ﬁrms will
have incentives to train less.
3.4 Further evidence on training and sectoral reallocation
We ﬁrst bring suggestive evidence that the idiosyncratic sectoral shock channel can be associated
with reallocation of lower-skill workers from the sectors doing relatively poorly to the sectors
11doing relatively better. Table 7 reports the correlations between the skill distribution of new
hires and the idiosyncratic sectoral shock.11 There is a positive correlation between the sectoral
shock and the fraction of unskilled “production” new hires, while all other correlations are
negative. (Note that there is no correlation between the skill group of the new hires and the
aggregate business cycle.) These results seem to indicate that sectors hit by relatively better
idiosyncratic shocks are more likely to increase their unskilled workforce.
Moreover, we use the worker side of the WES panel to investigate what factors inﬂuence the
training decision of workers. To this extent we estimate a logit ﬁxed eﬀects model separately
for men and for women controlling for the usual determinants of training: age, marital status,
education, occupation, ﬁrm size, tenure, and interactions between tenure and education to allow
for heterogeneous impacts of tenure across education groups.12 While we do not know the ﬁrm
or sector where a new worker is coming from (nor do we follow workers leaving a ﬁrm), what we
do know is whether a new worker with job tenure less than one year is also new to the sector.
This is our main control variable; as seen from Table 8 its impact is large and positive. Put
diﬀerently, a worker who is new to the ﬁrm and new to the sector is more likely to get trained,
all else equal. This eﬀect seems large, even more so for men than for women, and it indicates
that new entrants into a sector are more likely to get trained.
4 Sketch of a Mortensen-Pissarides model with training
Since we directly observe and control for innovation and the adoption of new technologies,
what we measure in the empirical section is the direct eﬀect of output ﬂuctuations on training
beyond innovation. The negative coeﬃcient on the aggregate output channel conforms to the
literature arguing that more training occurs during downturns, when the opportunity cost of
training is lower. We conjecture that the sectoral impact on training comes from a reallocation
mechanism: sectors doing relatively better will attract workers from sectors doing relatively
worse. The new workers will need skills training in the new sector. Moreover, it is more likely
that workers who move are low skill workers with less investment in sector-speciﬁc human
11Workers are only interviewed if they stay within the ﬁrm; thus, we cannot follow them as they move across
ﬁrms or sectors.
12While ﬁxed eﬀects will wipe out the eﬀect of non-varying regressors, ﬁxed eﬀects are still paramount in our
estimation, as they mitigate to a very large extent issues of self-selection into training.
12capital (which gets destroyed upon a move).
We present a brief sketch of a model where training responds to sectoral and aggregate
shocks as observed in the data. The model, based on Pissarides (2000), is a stylized textbook
model of training and productivity. We use it to illustrate the relationship between output
shocks − aggregate and sectoral − and training by ﬁrms. Here we only give the intuition of the
mechanisms and equilibrium predictions of the model; we leave the more technical exposition
and equations in Appendix I.
Consider the basic Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model in continuous time.
Unemployed workers search for a job and ﬁrms post vacancies. Once a worker meets a vacancy,
a match-speciﬁc productivity α is observed, and a match is formed if and only if the realized
productivity is above a given threshold R. Every period the productive match is subject to a
productivity shock y. We introduce aggregate and sectoral ﬂuctuations via this productivity
shock as y = pǫ, with p representing the aggregate shock and ǫ the idiosyncratic sectoral one.
Only matches with ongoing productivity above the reservation threshold R are preserved.
In our extension of the model, training is made available to workers at some cost for the
ﬁrm, resulting in increased worker productivity according to a speciﬁed human capital func-
tion. Training will take place as long as the beneﬁt from training is higher than the cost. In
equilibrium this implies that two categories of workers will be engaged in productive matches:
(ii) workers with high ex-ante productivity, who are above the reservation threshold R even
without training, and (ii) a second group of workers with medium to low ex-ante productivity;
without training these workers would fall below the reservation productivity threshold R, while
with training their productivity can jump above the reservation threshold. This implies that
the reservation threshold R gets de facto expanded into a productivity interval [R0,R]. Work-
ers falling in this interval are still able to form productive matches if they get training , while
workers with ex-ante productivities above R form productive matches without training. There
is a third category of workers, those with the lowest productivity (below R0) who would not
meet the reservation threshold R, even with training. Consequently, they will not get trained
and will not engage in a productive match.
When an aggregate negative shock p hits all sectors, training will increase as long as the
marginal cost of training is higher than the marginal beneﬁt with respect to p, which is easy to
13achieve under very reasonable parametrizations of the human capital function. This generates
the expected counter-cyclical channel of more training during periods of output decline.
When an idiosyncratic shock ǫ hits the sectors, there will be worker reallocation from the
low-shock to the high-shock sectors. The workers with smaller present values in the low-shock
sectors are likely to leave; they are also lower-productivity workers. (Some but not all of them
may have been below the employment productivity threshold R0 in the sector they leave). The
high-shock sectors will get an inﬂux of lower-productivity workers, both decreasing the average
match quality α and increasing worker congestion in the high-shock sectors. As a result, more
matches will fall within the training productivity interval, and thus more training will take
place in the relatively better sectors.
5 Conclusion
The sectoral analysis has been shown to be very important when specifying the links between the
aggregate business cycle, sectoral idiosyncratic shocks, ﬁrm innovation, and the incidence and
intensity of training. We ﬁnd training to be counter-cyclical − ﬁrms train more in downturns,
while sectoral shocks have a positive impact on training incidence − more training when the
sector has a relatively better position. As the magnitudes of these adjustments are of similar
order, we should not ignore either one.
We believe the ﬁnding of two opposing channels through which output ﬂuctuations aﬀect
training decisions is relevant for at least three reasons: (i) it gives us better insights into ﬁrms’
training decisions over the business cycle, (ii) it disentangles how aggregate and sectoral shocks
play into the human capital accumulation decision, and (iii) it helps policy-makers understand
that ﬂuctuations in training incidence may be an optimal response to macroeconomic shocks,
and not necessarily an indicator of underinvestment in training.
Previous literature has argued there is a role for government intervention in employer train-
ing. In deciding how much training to provide, ﬁrms will take into consideration how likely the
workers are to stay with the ﬁrm once the training is completed. If private returns to training
are large but ﬁrms do not train for fear of losing workers to higher-paying jobs, then it is socially
optimal for governments to intervene by providing training directly (or through incentives for
workers and ﬁrms to increase training). Nevertheless, we point out that governments should
14exercise caution when interpreting statistics on incidence of training by ﬁrms. The aggregate
and sectoral output ﬂuctuations documented here can inform policy whether observed trends
in training are healthy, as dictated by economic circumstances, or whether ﬁrms under-invest
in training and therefore government intervention should be recommended.
Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, we highlight the importance for any models of ﬁrm
training to incorporate mechanisms coming from both aggregate and sectoral output ﬂuctu-
ations. Such models help us get a better understanding of the training decisions by ﬁrms.
Moreover, any model used for policy prescriptions regarding training needs to be consistent
with both aggregate and idiosyncratic facts; a model only consistent with one or the other will
provide wrong policy recommendations.
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17Table 1: Statistics for Training Incidence and for Firm Speciﬁc Variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
% Workforce Trained 22.3% 34.75
Classroom Training Indicator 0.388 0.485
Firm size Number of workers employed by the workplace 19.28 48.37
Innovation Adoption new technology / innovation by the workplace 0.493 0.499
The most dominant sales market of the ﬁrm
Market: Local 0.850 0.357
Market: Canada 0.100 0.299
Market: World 0.050 0.218
Unionized Indicator whether workplace is unionized 0.058 0.235
Multiple loc. Indicator whether workplace belongs to multiple-location ﬁrm 0.550 0.497
% of workforce in each skill group
Staﬀ: % Administrative 0.199 0.273
Staﬀ: % Managerial 0.202 0.213
Staﬀ: % Other 0.061 0.196
Staﬀ: % Professionals 0.062 0.172
Staﬀ: % Sales 0.122 0.240
Staﬀ: % Production 0.159 0.265
Staﬀ: % Technical 0.195 0.306
Source: WES 1999-2006, ﬁrm side (2263 ﬁrms).
With slight abuse of notation, we use the terms “ﬁrm” and “workplace” interchangeably to denote a plant.
18Table 2: Sectors in the Analysis
Sector Relative Size (%)
Forestry and Mining 4 %
Construction 11 %
Transportation, Warehouse, Wholesale Trade 15 %
Information, Communication and Utilities 8 %
Finance and Insurance 9 %
Real Estate 5 %
Business Services 9 %
Education and Health 4 %
Manufacturing 24 %
Retail Trade and Consumer Services 11 %
Source: WES 1999-2006, ﬁrm side (2263 ﬁrms). Relative size of each sector expressed as
percentage of ﬁrms in the sector relative to total ﬁrms.
19Table 3: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral Output Fluctuations on Train-
ing Incidence: Extensive Margin
CT Indicator CT and OJT Indicator
Coef.a Std. Err. Coef.a Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP ﬂuctuations b -0.072 0.003 -0.040 0.003
Sector to GDP ratio (in %) 0.034 0.002 0.022 0.003
Innovation 0.629 0.005 0.643 0.005
Market: Canada c 0.406 0.011 0.580 0.011
Market: World 0.449 0.020 -0.491 0.019
ln (Firm size) 0.423 0.008 0.484 0.008
Multiple locations 0.112 0.006 -0.132 0.007
Unionized 0.133 0.020 -0.329 0.020
Staﬀ: % Administrative c 0.260 0.020 0.154 0.019
Staﬀ: % Managerial 0.560 0.020 0.610 0.019
Staﬀ: % Other 1.023 0.021 0.265 0.020
Staﬀ: % Sales 0.634 0.021 0.669 0.020
Staﬀ: % Production 0.734 0.019 0.538 0.019
Staﬀ: % Technical -0.083 0.018 0.162 0.019
GDP Trend 0.001 0.000 0.0002 0.0000
Dependent variable is an indicator whether the ﬁrm has trained or not. Data from WES 1999-2006,
Firm side. The number of observations (ﬁrms) is 8,913 (1,120). Estimation using ﬁxed eﬀects logit.
a Coeﬃcients are not marginal eﬀects, but the ratio of any two coeﬃcients is the same as the ratio of
the two marginal eﬀects. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity the factor of proportionality to transform
the coeﬃcients in marginal eﬀects would be 0.243.
b HP detrended log GDP.
c Base category: Local output market; % Professional in workforce.
20Table 4: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral Output Fluctuations on Training Decisions: All
Firms
% Workforce Trained Training Expenditures per Worker
Coef. Std.Err. Robust Coef. Std.Err. Robust
Std.Err. Std.Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP ﬂuctuations a -0.654 0.241 0.269 -4.286 3.597 8.229
Sector to GDP ratio (in %) 0.530 0.228 0.179 14.509 3.406 3.162
Innovation 5.979 0.509 1.783 53.208 7.604 25.493
Market: Canada b 2.498 1.008 2.203 50.423 15.060 25.950
Market: World 5.431 1.871 4.184 -0.066 27.943 29.910
ln (Firm size) -0.142 0.773 1.700 -57.999 11.547 38.391
Multiple locations 0.271 0.561 2.070 10.935 8.382 28.015
Unionized 4.865 1.833 4.582 55.636 27.379 33.687
Staﬀ: % Administrative b 2.506 1.838 3.068 -37.974 27.448 76.526
Staﬀ: % Managerial 2.806 1.889 2.859 55.753 28.223 69.274
Staﬀ: % Other 4.459 1.979 4.480 35.480 29.563 76.312
Staﬀ: % Sales 7.394 1.949 4.364 31.671 29.119 82.171
Staﬀ: % Production 3.663 1.836 5.081 14.117 27.424 82.691
Staﬀ: % Technical -2.222 1.836 4.949 -22.862 27.426 116.969
GDP Trend 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.091 0.049 0.154
Constant 3.562 4.235 11.121 37.748 63.260 155.615
Data from WES 1999-2006, Firm side. The number of observations (ﬁrms) is 16,208 (2,037). Estimation using ﬁxed eﬀects OLS.
a HP detrended log GDP.
b Base category: Local output market; % Professional in workforce.
21Table 5: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral Output Fluctuations on Training: Intensive Margin.
Sample Restricted to Firms who Train.
% Workforce Trained Training Expenditures per Worker
Coef. Std.Err. Robust Coef. Std.Err. Robust
Std.Err. Std.Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP ﬂuctuations a -0.895 0.298 0.336 -6.995 4.609 12.148
Sector to GDP ratio (in %) 0.703 0.280 0.283 19.040 4.285 4.296
Innovation 8.124 0.631 2.193 75.903 9.777 34.584
Market: Canada b 3.363 1.201 2.987 72.632 18.149 30.782
Market: World 8.727 2.291 5.520 10.860 34.553 33.021
ln (Firm size) -0.166 0.949 1.944 -84.155 14.489 49.956
Multiple locations 0.584 0.681 2.643 19.048 10.507 35.741
Unionized 5.769 2.126 5.315 58.835 32.087 35.016
Staﬀ: % Administrative b 2.901 2.248 4.768 -87.862 36.223 105.465
Staﬀ: % Managerial 3.994 2.369 4.302 119.290 36.987 91.543
Staﬀ: % Other 6.136 2.458 6.611 45.598 38.303 102.191
Staﬀ: % Sales 10.074 2.396 6.556 29.641 37.879 116.107
Staﬀ: % Production 4.985 2.243 7.687 14.900 35.046 108.943
Staﬀ: % Technical -2.026 2.151 5.919 -29.940 33.448 151.289
GDP Trend 0.010 0.004 0.012 0.129 0.061 0.187
Constant 5.849 5.126 13.991 97.866 79.372 194.019
Data from WES 1999-2006, Firm side. The sample is restricted to ﬁrms who train. The number of observations (ﬁrms) is
14,198(1,784). Estimation using ﬁxed eﬀects OLS.
a HP detrended log GDP.
b Base category: Local output market; % Professional in workforce.
22Table 6: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral Output Fluctuations on Training: Instrumenting
for Potential Endogeneity
% Workforce Trained Training Expenditures
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
GDP ﬂuctuations -0.85 1.69 -27.26 39.26
lag -0.36 0.86 -18.20 23.00
Sector to GDP ratio (in %) 2.35 1.16 32.99 14.92
lag -0.92 0.70 10.80 42.24
Training (LHS) lag 0.21 0.04 0.42 0.15
Innovation 9.08 2.04 104.30 86.05
lag 0.04 1.60 -28.66 61.14
ln (Firm size) -3.43 2.85 -291.18 657.84
lag -0.23 2.84 -93.09 131.24
Staﬀ: % Administrative 0.57 9.00 -384.31 471.67
lag -4.13 8.09 -994.44 363.89
Staﬀ: % Managerial 7.63 8.93 154.24 315.15
lag 11.72 9.46 -287.94 300.75
Staﬀ: % Other 0.99 9.30 29.33 301.11
lag 7.83 8.71 -582.62 317.15
Staﬀ: % Sales 6.97 10.28 337.00 299.49
lag 20.30 8.83 -148.01 312.99
Staﬀ:% Production -0.22 9.22 138.02 274.34
lag 0.33 7.81 -499.83 316.58
Staﬀ: % Technical -6.97 9.54 -46.07 335.82
lag 10.02 8.95 -512.12 413.94
Multiple locations -5.86 3.63 166.18 57.59
lag 2.45 2.58 24.00 55.23
Unionized 7.03 5.88 9.00 73.35
lag 1.38 5.22 -91.16 75.76
Market: Canada 0.65 3.31 87.59 72.28
lag -0.91 2.75 -42.90 96.34
Market: World 6.30 5.58 -30.77 75.50
lag -3.52 5.22 -47.12 88.88
GDP Trend -0.22 0.73 -9.21 25.12
lag 0.22 0.72 10.99 24.62
Constant 23.47 46.93
AR(1) test (Arrelano-Bond) z=-11.99 P>z=0.000 z=-2.47 P>z=0.013
AR(2) test (Arrelano-Bond) z=0.18 P>z=0.861 z=1.20 P>z=0.229
Overid. test (Sargan) χ2(75)=780.34 P > χ2=0.000 χ2(45)=524.29 P > χ2=0.000
Overid. test (Hansen) χ2(45)=91.10 P > χ2=0.099 χ2(45)=61.01 P > χ2=0.056
a Data from WES 1999-2006, Firm side. 12,642 observations (1818 ﬁrms).
b HP detrended log GDP.
c Base category Local output market; % Professional in workforce.
23Table 7: Correlations Between the Skill Category of New Hires and
the Sectoral and Aggregate Fluctuations
Correlation with Correlation with








* Correlations signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Data from WES 1999-2006, Firm side.
Table 8: Determinants of Training Incidence, Worker Side
Variables Coeﬃcients Std. Err. Coeﬃcients Std. Err.
Men Women
Worker New in Sector 0.431 0.004 0.201 0.004
Age -0.193 0.001 -0.204 0.001
Married 0.271 0.004 0.041 0.004
Community College 0.394 0.006 -0.185 0.006
University 0.505 0.010 0.049 0.010
Post-graduate -0.212 0.016 -1.621 0.019
Unionized 0.503 0.004 0.204 0.004
Occ: Managerial 0.327 0.007 0.342 0.007
Occ: Technician -0.033 0.006 -0.242 0.005
Occ: Administrative 0.008 0.009 -0.581 0.005
Occ: Sales -0.856 0.012 -1.245 0.008
Occ: Production -0.036 0.008 0.444 0.008
Job tenure -0.040 0.001 -0.067 0.001
Job tenure 2 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Tenure * College 0.041 0.001 0.045 0.001
Tenure * University -0.008 0.001 0.030 0.001
Tenure * Postgrad 0.031 0.002 0.036 0.001
Small ﬁrm 0.057 0.005 1.021 0.006
Medium ﬁrm -0.016 0.007 1.417 0.008
Large ﬁrm -0.252 0.010 1.480 0.011
Data from WES 1999-2006, Worker side. The number of observations
(workers) is 18,659 (8,697) for men and 14,717 (6,749) for women.
Estimation using ﬁxed eﬀects logit.
24Appendix I Sketch of Mortensen-Pissarides model with
training
Firms open vacancies whenever they want to ﬁll a job. Keeping a vacancy open implies a cost c.
The rate at which unemployed workers and open vacancies meet, in each sector is regulated by
meeting functions m(vi,u) that depends on the number of unemployed workers and vacancies
created in the particular sector i. Once there is a meeting ﬁrms observe the worker speciﬁc
productivity α and decide if the candidate is suitable for the job. A productive match is formed
if α is above the reservation value Ri. Upon creating a match the ﬁrm evaluates the opportunity
to train the worker. Depending on the productivity of the worker and whether the worker has
been trained or not a wage wk(α) is paid, with k = u,τ for untrained and trained respectively.
Training, as well as the productivity α, are speciﬁc to the match: if the match is dissolved
the worker returns to the pool of unemployed workers with unknown productivity, and with
the same expected productivity she had before the match (and same as everybody else in that
pool). After a match is created shocks can arrive at a rate λ which will dissolve the match and
let the worker be unemployed again. Wages are set by Nash bargaining.
Following Pissarides (2000) the meeting function is written as m(vi,u) = m(1, u
vi)vi ≡
q(θi)vi, where θi =
vi
u is market tightness in sector i. Given the meeting function the ratio at




Ri dF(α), where b is the upper limit of
the shock distribution and r is the reservation value. The ratio at which unemployed workers




Appendix I.1 Value of a match to an employer
The value of a job to an employer depends on the productivity speciﬁc to that match and
the level of training given to the worker. We assume that the level of training is decided at
the starting of a match (empirical evidence from the NLSY suggests that training takes place
very early in the employer tenure), and that the cost of training is paid by the employer every
period the worker is employed (such an insurance-type cost scheme enables ﬁrm training even
if training is in transferable general skills). Output is the product of the shock α and the
productivity parameter yi = pǫi, where p is an aggregate productivity shock and ǫi a sector-
speciﬁc idiosyncratic one.
25The value of a match to an employer who trains Ju
i (α) − or not Ju
i (α) − is given by:
rJ
u
i (α) = yiα − w
u





i (α) = yih(α) − w
τ
i (α) − C(yα) − λJ
τ
i (α). (8)
Here h(α) is a function that describes how productivity increases with training and it is assumed
to be increasing in α, C(yα) is the cost of training, and wτ and wu the wage rates oﬀered to
the trained and respectively untrained workers.13
The asset equations above describe the value of a match. Training is required for workers
with productivity levels above the reservation threshold Ri but below ατ,i, while is not required
for workers with higher productivity. Given a unique training reservation productivity, the














where the superscript e indicates the expectation conditional on α being greater than the
productivity threshold Ri.
Appendix I.2 Value of a match to a worker
The value of a match to a worker is determined by the following asset equations:
rW
u
i (α) = w
u





i (α) = w
τ
i (α) + λ[U − W
τ
i (α)]. (11)














Appendix I.3 Value of a vacancy and of unemployment
The value of setting a vacancy to an employer is
rVi = −c + q
f
i [Je − V ].
13Note that if we were interested in say the optimal amount of training T oﬀered, we could introduce it via
the beneﬁt and cost of training h(α,T) and C(T,yα) where T can denote the amount of training, h(α,T) is
concave in T and C(T,yα) is convex in T. Here we focus on training incidence instead.
26In equilibrium free entry sets the value of a vacancy to zero.
The value of unemployment to a worker depends on the number and the conditions of all
sectors in the economy, since each unemployed worker can be matched stochastically with any
of the ﬁrms opening vacancies in each sector. For simplicity, we assume that there are only
two sectors in the economy indexed by i = 1,2. In this case we have that the total number
of vacancies formed in the economy is given by v = v1 + v2 and the overall tightness of the
economy is described by θ = θ1 + θ2. The value of unemployment is then
rU = z + qw
1 [W e
1 − U] + qw
2 [W e
2 − U],
where z represents unemployment contingent income.
Appendix I.4 Wages and Training
Assuming that the wage rates are set following the Nash bargaining rule, after some algebra
we can derive the wage rate for trained and untrained workers,
w
τ
i (α) = β[yih(α) − C(yiα)] + (1 − β)z + βcθ (13)
w
u
i (α) = βyiα + (1 − β)z + βcθ. (14)
Reservation value for training
Training occurs as long as Jτ(α) ≥ 0 and up to the point where the value of an untrained
match is equal to the value of a trained match, that is, Ju(ατ) = Jτ(ατ), or:
yi[ατ,i − h(ατ,i)] = w
u
i (ατ,i) − w
τ
i (ατ,i) − C(yiατ,i)
yi[h(ατ,i) − ατ,i] = C(yiατ,i) (15)
Reservation value for hiring
The reservation value for hiring is set by the following equation max{Ju(R),Jτ(R)} = 0. Notice
that, as long as R < ατ (and therefore some training occurs), the relevant condition can be
re-written as Jτ(R) = 0, or (1 − β)[yh(R) − C(yR)] = (1 − β)z + βcθ.




27Appendix I.5 Aggregate Shocks
Assume that sectors 1 and 2 are identical (because the assumption that sectors are identical
we drop the subscript “i”), and focus on how the aggregate productivity shock p inﬂuences the
decision to train. When p changes the two reservation productivity thresholds ατ (for training
decisions) and R (for hiring decisions) may also change.
From equation (15) we can see that if and how ατ changes depends on what we assume
about the functions h and C. We can therefore ﬁnd appropriate functions that deliver the
predictions we observe from the data. In particular, if we assume that




when overall productivity decreases, training gets more convenient because its cost decreases
faster than the relative beneﬁt and ατ raises.
When y decreases θ should decrease as well since unemployment increases for the whole
economy more than vacancies do. Therefore, the RHS of (16) decreases and the so LHS has to
decrease as well. If, like in the basic Pissarided model with stochastic job matching, R should
also increase, then the higher R in this case might imply lower training because relatively more
workers with higher productivity and no need for training are going to be hired. (Note there
is no such problem if R does not increase, or if at the same time ατ raises suﬃciently). The
ﬁnal eﬀect would depend on the parametrization of the model and the choice of h and C, and
as such, we can always ﬁnd reasonable functions for which the ﬁrst channel on ατ prevails and
generates counter-cyclical training.
Appendix I.6 Sectoral reallocation
The impact of the idiosyncratic shock ǫi is easier to show when we think of the adjustments
that happen when one sector only, say for instance sector 2, experiences a negative shock, that
is, ǫ2 is lower. Re-proposing equation (16) for sector 1 we have,




The new steady state implies a higher unemployment and lower θ, adjustments through which
sector 2 inﬂuences sector 1. In equation (18) the RHS is lower, and, because y1 does not go
28down, the only way to re-establish the equality is by reducing R. (Also note that with no change
in ǫ1, ατ,1 does not change, as θ does not enter in its determination.) Therefore, because the
pool of workers to be trained is now larger, training will increase in sector 1.
29Appendix II Firm-speciﬁc determinants of training in-
cidence
Table II1: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral Output Fluctuations on Training Incidence:
Extensive Margin. OLS analysis (dychotomous dependent variable).
CT Indicator
Coef. Std. Err.a Robusta
Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3)
GDP ﬂuctuations b -0.010 0.004 0.005
Sector to GDP ratio (in %) 0.005 0.002 0.001
Innovation 0.085 0.020 0.068
Market: Canada c 0.053 0.049 0.108
Market: World 0.042 0.071 0.159
ln (Firm size) 0.061 0.023 0.051
Multiple locations 0.014 0.026 0.095
Unionized 0.013 0.037 0.093
Staﬀ: % Administrative c 0.053 0.039 0.065
Staﬀ: % Managerial 0.085 0.046 0.069
Staﬀ: % Other 0.135 0.068 0.153
Staﬀ: % Sales 0.092 0.047 0.105
Staﬀ: % Production 0.097 0.087 0.242
Staﬀ: % Technical -0.029 0.039 0.104
GDP Trend 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant -0.073 0.149 0.390
Data from WES 1999-2006, Firm side. The number of observations (ﬁrms) is
8,913 (1,120). Estimation using ﬁxed eﬀects OLS.
a Standard errors are computed in two ways: without accounting for clustering by
sector in column (2) , and accounting for clustering in column (3). Section 3.2
has more details on the diﬀerence in approaches and its substantive implications.
b HP detrended log GDP.
c Base category Local output market; % Professional in workforce.
30